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Johnson v. Wetherspoon:' Survivor's Benefits, Whose Money
Is It Anyway?

I. THE PROBLEM

Mr. Johnson, a member of the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana
(TRSL), designated his second wife as the beneficiary of any survivor's benefits
due under his statutory retirement plan. In 1984, he died while still employed.
Thus, the survivor's benefits paid were paid to his second wife as the designated
beneficiary. These payments are analogous to disbursements under a life
insurance plan. Life insurance claims are ordinarily only payable to the named
beneficiary. Nevertheless, ten years after his death, Mr. Johnson's first wife
demanded a share of those benefits allegedly attributable to his employment
during their marriage. The first court to hear the case, properly construing
existing law, granted summaryjudgment in favor ofthe second wife. Surprisingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and remanded.'
The court held that the survivor's benefits under the state plan were an asset
of the first community to the extent attributable to the decedent's employment
during the existence of the first community.' Thus, Mr. Johnson's first wife was
entitled to a portion of the survivor's benefits. This paper will explain why the
court's holding is contrary to existing law.
II. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM
Congress has legislated extensively in the field of private employee pensions.
The primary federal acts are: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)4 and the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA). 5 However,
these two acts only apply to private, and not public, pensions.6 Thus, state law
is only preempted in the field ofprivate and not public pensions. The TRSL, the
plan Mr. Johnson had, is a public pension; ERISA and the REA do not apply in
our case. Moreover, in Frazierv. Harper,the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
state community property laws control how public pension benefits payable to
a covered employee are distributed.7
Even before Frazier,in Sims v. Sims, the court may have anticipated the
Johnson case. There, the court laid the groundwork for the Johnson holding.

1.
2.
3.
4.
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6.
7.
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In a very broad assertion the court said that "[a] spouse's right to receive an
annuity, lump sum benefit, or other benefits payable by a retirement plan is, to
the extent attributable to his employment during the community, therefore an
asset of the community."'
What is and is not an "other benefit" is not well defined. The question for
our purposes turns on whether a survivor's benefit qualifies as an "other benefit."
If, as the Johnson court held, it is an "other benefit," then the Sims holding
applies and community property laws govern disbursement.
III. WHAT ISA SURVIVORS BENEFIT?
A survivor's benefit is a benefit paid when the employee dies while still
actively employed. Although administered by the pension authority, it differs
from a pension because the "pension" ceases to exist when the employee dies and
is only payable upon retirement. A joint and survivor's annuity also differs from
a survivor's benefit, being merely an election of how the pension will be paid if
the employee dies after retiring. The joint and survivor's annuity election
extends the pension to the designated survivor after the death of the employee.
Thus, both a pension and a joint and survivor's annuity are retirement benefits.
A survivor's benefit is not. To collect a survivor's benefit the employee
must not have retired. Accordingly, the survivor's benefit presents a more
difficult problem than either ordinary pension benefits or a joint and survivor's
annuity. Both a pension and a joint and survivor's annuity fall directly within
the scope of "pension" and do not require a precise definition of "other benefit"
to determine proper disposition.
IV.

THE ANALYSIS

A. An Overly Broad Interpretationof "OtherBenefits"
The supreme court has never defined what an "other benefit" is. An overly
broad interpretation of "other benefit" would include every benefit payable by
a retirement plan to the retiree or his survivor that is not a post-retirement lump
sum or annuity. This is most likely the definition that the Johnson court was
using. Substantial support for this position can be found in existing jurisprudence and legislation.
In T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery,9 the supreme court held that
retirement benefits are a form of "deferred compensation (additional remuneration) to the employee for his labors during his working lifetime."'0 From this
understanding comes the holding in Johnson. If all retirement benefits are a

8. 358 So. 2d at 922 (emphasis added).
9. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
10. Id. at 849.
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form of "deferred compensation" and community propeity, under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2338, is defined as "property acquired during the existence of the
legal regime through the effort, skill or industry of either spouse; ... "" then
all retirement benefits should be community property. Under this interpretation,
any payment made pursuant to a retirement plan to a retiree would be a
community asset regardless of its "other" status. Thus, even the ex-spouse would
be entitled to a proportionate share of the "other benefit." This was the holding
in Johnson. 2
Problematically, this puts Louisiana's survivor's benefits law in direct
opposition to federal law and partly with its own. Federal law requires
3
As
survivor's benefits to be paid to the surviving spouse, if one exists.'
Federal law covers private pensions, including Louisiana's, Louisiana private
pensions pay only the surviving spouse without regard to any pre-existing
community. Our own legislature has already recognized the wisdom inherent in
the federal law.
Notwithstanding T.L. James & Co., and Johnson'sbroad interpretation of
"other benefit," there is a statutory exception for the proceeds of a life insurance
4
policy, even if it is provided as part of the survivor's benefit package.'
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:647 provides that the proceeds of a life insurance
policy are to be paid to the named beneficiary without regard to the claims of
any legatee, heir or creditor, including a surviving spouse." Ownership of a
life insurance policy is determined to be separate or community property
6
according to the marital status of the purchaser at the time of purchase. If the
policy was purchased by the insured during the existence of the community, with
community funds then it is co-owned by the spouses as community property.
7
The ex-spouse, obtains an inchoate right of co-ownership in the policy.' Co-

11. La. Civ. Code art. 2338:

The community property comprises: property acquired during the existence of the legal
regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property acquired with
community things or with community and separate things, unless classified as separate
property under Article 2341; property donated to the spouses jointly; natural and civil
fruits of community property; damages awarded for loss or injury to athing belonging to
the community; and all other property not classified by law as separate property.
12. Johnson v. Wetherspoon, 694 So. 2d 203 (La. 1997).
13. See supra notes 4 and 5.
14. See Richard B. Wilkins, Jr., Comment, Insurance and the Community, 25 La. L. Rev. 492

(1965).
15. La. R.S. 22:647 (1995) which states:
The lawful beneficiary, assignee, or payee, including the insured's estate, of a life
insurance policy.., shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of the policy against the
creditors and representatives of the insured ... and against the heirs and legatees of either
such person, and such proceeds and avails shall also be exempt from all liability for any
debt of such beneficiary....
16. Berry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
17. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
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owners of corporeal things have some control over the co-owned property;"8
however, this is not always true for incorporeal things. 9 Ownership of an
insurance policy is an incorporeal right, and under the theory of contractual
privity the non-contracting spouse has no control over the policy.2"
B. The Theory of ContractualPrivity
The theory of contractual privity provides that contracts have effects only
between parties to the contract. 2' Comment (b) to Louisiana'Civil Code article
2346 states that a spouse ". . . may not affect the legal relations and responsibilities of the spouse who incurred the obligation and the other party... to that
contract, because in principle, contracts produce effects as between the parties
only." In Johnson, the contract was between the deceased and TRSL. The
contract is very similar to an insurance contract; it pays money to a beneficiary
upon the death of the contracting party. With the Johnson case as the exception,
an ex-spouse may not interfere with a contract between an insurance company
and its insured.2"
Although the ex-spouse is in some sense a co-owner of the policy, in the
insurance context, contractual privity serves to prohibit the exercise of this
inchoate right. The contractual protection of the insured extends so far as to
allow the changing of the beneficiary without the ex-spouse's consent; 3 the exspouse has no right to intervene.
Additionally, there is a further distinction between spousal co-ownership and
the right to receive the proceeds of the policy after the death of the insured.24
When the employee names a party as the beneficiary, the surviving ex-spouse
will not receive any compensation or reimbursement for community funds used
to pay life insurance premiums. Further, the surviving ex-spouse is precluded
from asserting a claim against the designated beneficiary for reimbursement.25
Likewise, with regard to the treatment of Individual Retirement Accounts,
under the rule of contractual privity the contracting spouse has the exclusive
power to alter relations with the third person contracting party, and the other
spouse has no management rights in that regard.2 This protects the Trustee
from the conflicting claims of spouses who might otherwise assert community
property rights. This protection is codified in Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:762,

18. La. Civ. Code art. 809.
19. Katherine S.Spaht and W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 5.4, at234, in 16 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1997).
20. Id.
21. La. Civ. Code art. 1985.
22. See Spaht and Hargrave, supra note 19, § 5.4, at 234.
23. Id. § 5.4.
24. Kambur v. Kambur, 652 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
25. See supra notes 14 and 15.
26. See W. Lee Hargrave, Community Property Interests in IndividualRetirement Accounts, 55
La. L. Rev 509 (1995).
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which states that once the trustee pays the beneficiary or estate, the trustee is not
liable for any claims on the payment except a claim by the beneficiary or
estate.27 Federal Law treats private pensions very similarly.
C. FederalLaw GoverningPrivatePensions
2
Federal law, specifically ERISA and REA, governs private pensions. "
Congress enacted this legislation to establish national uniformity and to protect
retirement benefits.29 ERISA was designed to protect retirement benefits and
3°
Ten years after
assure their receipt by employees and their dependents.
the "conflicting
to
response
in
REA
it
enacted
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particularly
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plan
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in
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rights
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established
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under community property regimes."'"
can
ex-spouse
or
a
spouse
which
by
means
only
the
Relations Order (QDRO) as
32
REA
and
ERISA
employee.
of
the
benefits
establish a claim on the survivor's
33
mandate that survivor's benefits are to be paid first to the surviving spouse.
Congress, in effect, elected to designate for each and every participant in an
34
ERISA plan precisely who the beneficiary is, the surviving spouse.

D. Comparison of Survivor's Benefits Under Federaland State Law
The treatment of survivor's benefits by federal courts under ERISA and
REA is similar to the treatment of the proceeds of a life insurance contract by
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:647. In all cases the payment goes to the
designated beneficiary whether the beneficiary is determined by the employee or
3
by statute and cannot be attached by any other party. " However, Louisiana law
and federal law diverge on the issue of distribution of survivor's benefits.
The Louisiana Supreme Court decided that under Louisiana law, survivor's
benefits do not necessarily go to the designated beneficiary, even when it is the
surviving spouse.36 Instead, survivor's benefits are community property subject
37
to proportionate disbursement between the ex-spouse and the surviving spouse.
They came to this conclusion despite Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:701 and
11:762, which provide that a spouse is "a person who is legally married to a

27. La. R.S. 11:762 (1993).
28. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
29. Id.
30. Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1754
(1997).
31. Id. at 1178.
32. Id. at 1179.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994).
34. See Boggs, 89 F.3d at 1180.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994) and La. R.S. 22:647 (1995).
36. Johnson v. Wetherspoon, 694 So. 2d 203 (La. 1997).
37. Id.
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member of this system [TRSL] and shall not include a person who is legally
3
separatedfrom a member ... by a judgment of separation"
and that
39
survivor's benefits must go to the surviving spouse.
There is nothing in the statutes directing payment to anyone other than the
surviving spouse or surviving minor children. Moreover, the literal wording of
the statute seems to preclude payment to a person who is legally separated from
a member by a judgment of separation,4" which includes ex-spouses. Justice
Calogero, in dissent, argued that the ex-spouse was not entitled to receive a
statutory payment unless designated as a beneficiary. 4
Although there is similar language in the federal and state law, the federal
and state courts have reached different conclusions. Under the federal scheme,
the surviving spouse is as a matter of law entitled to the survivor's benefits.
Under Louisiana community property law, the surviving spouse must ratably
share survivor's benefits with the ex-spouse.
E. The Problem with the Court'sInterpretationof the Benefit Calculation
With survivor's benefits, the amount the beneficiary will receive is
determined by statute.42 There are different formulae for calculating the amount
the beneficiary is to receive. The specific formula depends upon whether the
beneficiary is a surviving spouse with or without minor children. For example,
if there is a surviving spouse with no minor children, the monthly payment is the
greater of $300 or the equivalent of the joint and survivor annuity for regular
retirement pension.43
The annuity equivalent is calculated by multiplying the employee's
years of service times 21/% times monthly base pay at death.44 For an
employee with twenty years of service earning $1000 a month, the result would
be 20 x .025 x $1000 = $500. This is the same formula used to calculate
pension benefits except that the percentage changes based upon years of service
in a pension calculation. The majority in Johnsonuses this fact to support their

holding that survivor's benefits are the same as pension benefits.45 The
court argues that since survivor's benefits are calculated in the same
manner as pension benefits they should be treated the same-as community
property.46

38. La. R.S. 11:701(24) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
39. La. R.S. 11:762 (Supp. 1998).
40. Id.
41. Johnson, 694 So. 2d at 212 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
42. La. R.S. 11:762 (Supp. 1998). Cf Eskine v. Eskine, 518 So. 2d 505 (La. 1988).

The

Louisiana Supreme Court ordered a public pension to split a pension check between the employee
and ex-spouse after the pension had been judicially partitioned.
43. La. R.S. 11:762 (Supp. 1998).
44. See Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).
45. Johnson, 694 So. 2d at 209.
46. Id.
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While the legislation does borrow the formula for calculating pension
benefits, three policies underlying the survivor's benefits scheme demonstrate
noteworthy differences. (1) Survivor's benefits, benefits paid if the employee
dies while still working, are suspended upon remarriage of the surviving
spouse4 while pension benefits, benefits paid after the employee retires, under
a joint and survivor's annuity are not. (2) Survivor's benefits take into account
whether or not there are surviving minor children to determine if there will be
payments; pension benefits do not. (3) There is an additional policy driving the
awarding of deferred compensation. That policy is to protect and provide for a
surviving spouse and minor children. At the time of the employee spouse's
death, they are presumed to be, at least in part, dependent upon the employee's
income. The employee was their means of support. This militates in favor of
treating survivor's benefits as the property of the survivor and not community
property.
F. Problemswith TreatingSurvivor'sBenefits as Community Property: Who
Pays Whom?
If the survivor's benefit is a community asset, this raises the question of how
the ex-spouse should be paid. TRSL may make payments only to the surviving
spouse or the designated beneficiary.48 The payment or actual refund of
contributions may only go to the employee's estate if there is no other
beneficiary. Under the Johnson facts, there was a surviving spouse who was
statutorily entitled to the payment; thus, no payment could directly be made to
the ex-spouse. The supreme court resolved this problem by ordering the
surviving spouse to pay the ex-spouse a portion of past payments received and
of future payments.49 The result is that two parties who are likely to be on
unfriendly terms must arrange for a transfer of payments, and future courts are
enlisted to ensure that the surviving spouse, who would otherwise have no legal
relationship with the ex-spouse, transfers those assets.
Treating survivor's benefits as community property also seems to conflict
with the policy mentioned above, to take care of the employee's dependents at
the death of the employee. By the time the employee dies, the ex-spouse will
have had the opportunity to reestablish a means of support. Whereas, the
surviving spouse and children presumably have not.
The Johnson court noted that the surviving spouse need not split the benefit
absent a demand from the ex-spouse.5 However, the question remains to whom
the demand must be made. If demand must only be made to the surviving spouse,
what form of proof of community is the surviving spouse required to accept?

47.
48.
49.
50.

La. RS. ii:762(D)(2) (1993).
La. R.S. 11:762 (1993).
Johnson, 694 So. 2d at 205.
Id. n.2.
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Moreover, the surviving spouse is only entitled to the benefit until death or
remarriage. This raises the issue of whether the surviving spouse must pay the exspouse even ifthe surviving spouse is not receiving anypayment. If the surviving
spouse remarries, she does not receive a survivor's benefit payment. If she is not
receiving a payment, there is nothing to share with the ex-spouse. The court has
held many times that the payments from a pension are shared only when
received." Therefore, according to the court's holding that survivor's benefits
are pension benefits, the ex-spouse receives nothing if the surviving spouse is not
receiving a payment. Additionally, if the employee had never re-married, or ifthe
surviving spouse dies before the ex-spouse, the ex-spousereceivesnothing. Under
the court's reasoning, it is in the ex-spouse's best interest for the employee spouse
to remarry someone who will live a long time and not remarry.
If the legislature authorizes payments by TRSL directly to the ex-spouse, the
retirement plan may pay out more than it is.obligated to. For example, the value
of a joint and survivor annuity is calculated within one month of the employee's
death. 2 This calculation involves the life expectancies of the employee, which
equals zero, and that of the surviving spouse as calculatedby actuarial tables. If
the payment were to go directly to the ex-spouse, that life expectancy must be
included as well. The plan could be made to pay for the duration ofboth spouses'
lives instead ofjust the surviving spouse. There is certainly the possibility that
more than one prior community existed; therefore, it is conceivable that ifa direct
allowance was provided for, the plan could pay out for the duration of many
unintended lifetimes.
As alluded to above, the retirement plan authorities are unlikely to know of
the existence of an ex-spouse or the exact amount attributable to that person
without a court order or filing for payments. This raises the question of whether
the arrival of an ex-spouse requires a recalculation of the payments.
TRSL provides for recalculating benefits and will do so at the request of the
employee. The employee is then charged for the service. In our case, the
employee is dead and so who should pay the charge; the surviving spouse, the exspouse, the plan, or perhaps a waiver can be made.
The court also did not address the issue ofwhether the ex-spouse may receive
payments ifshe has remarried. If payments were coming directly from TRSL, the
answer would be no. TRSL requires that the beneficiary re-qualify for payments
yearly. However, the payments to the ex-spouse are made indirectly through the
surviving spouse.
Is the court going to require that the ex-spouse certify yearly to the surviving
spouse that she is still eligible for the payments? Does this give an ex-spouse the
right to challenge a surviving spouse's remarriage on the grounds that it would
eliminate her benefit payment, a vested right? These unanswered questions call
for legislative answers.

51. Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919, 922-23 (La. 1978).
52. La. R.S. 11:762 (Supp. 1998).
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G. Analogy to the Legal Usufruct Createdby Louisiana Civil Code Article
890.1
In Louisiana Civil Code article 890.1," the Louisiana Legislature created
a legal usufruct over recurring payments from a retirement plan. Although the
situation contemplated in the article is not exactly the same as survivor's
benefits, it provides a strong basis for analogy. The statue provides that if
recurring payments are being made, and are community property, upon the death
of one spouse the other receives a legal usufruct over any future payments from
the same source. In other words the employee spouse, upon the death of the
non-employee spouse, gets a usufruct over the non-employee spouse's portion of
the payment. This does not give the employee spouse ownership ofthe payment,
but a usufruct subject to an accounting upon termination of the usufruct.
The purpose of this article, as stated in the source article, is "to preserve the
community upon the death of one spouse and to grant to the survivor the means
'
for maintaining himself and his family."54
This protects the surviving spouse
against the claims of forced heirs or other legatees. Under Article 890.1, a
spouse who is a co-owner of a pension right is allowed to transfer the naked
ownership to that spouse's heirs; however, the surviving spouse receives the
payments and the usufruct over them.
As applied to survivor's benefits, the payment of the ex-spouse's community
interest would be received by the surviving spouse who would retain the usufruct
over those funds, just as, under Article 890.1, where the heir's portion is received
by the surviving spouse. In both cases, the non-spouse parties would get the
naked ownership of the disbursements; and a usufruct is created in favor of the
surviving spouse; furthering the legislature's goal of providing for the surviving
spouse.
V. CONCLUSION

The legislature should act to insure that survivor's benefits are owned by the
surviving spouse. Although the court ruled that survivor's benefits are "other
benefits" of a retirement plan and as such are subject to community property

53. La. Civ. Code art. 890.1 states:
If a recurring payment is being made from a public or private pension plan or retirement
plan, an annuity policy or plan, an individual retirement account, a Keough plan, a
simplified employee plan, or any other similar retirement plan, to one partner or to both
partners ofa marriage, and the payment constitutes community property, and one spouse
dies, the surviving spouse shall enjoy a legal usufruct over any portion ofthe continuing
recurring payment which was the deceased spouse's share of their community property,
provided the source of the benefit is due to payments made by or on behalf of the
survivor.... The usufruct granted by this Article shall be treated as a legal usufruct and
is not an impingement upon the legitime and a naked owner shall not have the right to
demand security.
54. State v. Costello, 158 So. 2d 850, 852 (1963).
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laws and partition between the surviving spouse and the ex-spouse, this area of
the law remains unclear. The majority's argument is that the survivor's benefits
were earned during the community by the effort of one spouse and are therefore
community property. This ruling, however, will only apply to public pensions
in Louisiana, as the federal government has legislated in ERISA and REA that
all survivor's benefits paid by private or federal pensions belong to the
survivor." Additionally, the policies of providing for the survivor over all
other parties including creditors, heirs and legatees are subverted by the court's
ruling.
If survivor's benefits are treated as community property, a problem arises in
the distribution of payments to the ex-spouse. Requiring the ex-spouse to file a
claim against the surviving spouse is likely to increase the tension that may
already exists between the two. It also leads to the absurd result that the exspouse can receive the payments, if and only if the surviving spouse is receiving
them from the pension plan. Accordingly, if there is no surviving spouse or if
the survivor remarries or dies, the ex-spouse receives nothing. By allowing the
ex-spouse to recover from the surviving spouse the Johnson court has awarded
the ex-spouse a windfall. In the interest of simplicity and consistency with
federal legislation and policies of the Louisiana Civil Code the legislature should
treat survivor's benefits in the same way that they are treated by federal law.
Juston Michael O'Brien

55. Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1754
(1997).

